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FYI: New NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture

March 31st, 2011 No comments
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In case you weren’t aware, NIST has a WIKI for collaboration on Cloud Computing.  You can find it here.

They also have a draft of their v1.0 Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, which builds upon the prior definitional work we’ve seen before and has pretty graphics.  You can find that, here (dated 3/30/2011)

/Hoff

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Dedicated AWS VPC Compute Instances – Strategically Defensive or Offensive?

March 28th, 2011 9 comments

Chugging right along on the feature enhancement locomotive, following the extension of networking capabilities of their Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) offerings last week (see: AWS’ New Networking Capabilities – Sucking Less 😉 ,) Amazon Web Services today announced the availability of dedicated (both on-demand and dedicated) compute instances within a VPC:

Dedicated Instances are Amazon EC2 instances launched within your Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) that run hardware dedicated to a single customer. Dedicated Instances let you take full advantage of the benefits of Amazon VPC and the AWS cloud – on-demand elastic provisioning, pay only for what you use, and a private, isolated virtual network, all while ensuring that your Amazon EC2 compute instances will be isolated at the hardware level.

That’s interesting, isn’t it?  I remember writing this post ” Calling All Private Cloud Haters: Amazon Just Peed On Your Fire Hydrant… and chuckling when AWS announced VPC back in 2009 in which I suggested that VPC:

  • Legitimized Private Cloud as a reasonable, needed, and prudent step toward Cloud adoption for enterprises,
  • Substantiated the value proposition of Private Cloud as a way of removing a barrier to Cloud entry for enterprises, and
  • Validated the ultimate vision toward hybrid Clouds and Inter-Cloud

That got some hackles up.

So this morning, people immediately started squawking on Twitter about how this looked remarkably like (or didn’t) private cloud or dedicated hosting.  This is why, about two years ago, I generated this taxonomy that pointed out the gray area of “private cloud” — the notion of who manages it, who owns the infrastructure, where it’s located and who it’s consumed by:

I did a lot of this work well before I utilized it in the original Cloud Security Alliance Guidance architecture chapter I wrote, but that experienced refined what I meant a little more clearly and this version was produced PRIOR to the NIST guidance which is why you don’t see mention of “community cloud”:

  1. Private
    Private Clouds are provided by an organization or their designated service provider and offer a single-tenant (dedicated) operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity* and the accountability/utility model of Cloud.  The physical infrastructure may be owned by and/or physically located in the organization’s datacenters (on-premise) or that of a designated service provider (off-premise) with an extension of management and security control planes controlled by the organization or designated service provider respectively.
    The consumers of the service are considered “trusted.”  Trusted consumers of service are those who are considered part of an organization’s legal/contractual umbrella including employees, contractors, & business partners.  Untrusted consumers are those that may be authorized to consume some/all services but are not logical extensions of the organization.
  2. Public
    Public Clouds are provided by a designated service provider and may offer either a single-tenant (dedicated) or multi-tenant (shared) operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity and the  accountability/utility model of Cloud.
    The physical infrastructure is generally owned by and managed by the designated service provider and located within the provider’s datacenters (off-premise.)  Consumers of Public Cloud services are considered to be untrusted.
  3. Managed
    Managed Clouds are provided by a designated service provider and may offer either a single-tenant (dedicated) or multi-tenant (shared) operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity and the  accountability/utility model of Cloud.The physical infrastructure is owned by and/or physically located in the organization’s datacenters with an extension of management and security control planes controlled by the designated service provider.  Consumers of Managed Clouds may be trusted or untrusted.
  4. Hybrid
    Hybrid Clouds are a combination of public and private cloud offerings that allow for transitive information exchange and possibly application compatibility and portability across disparate Cloud service offerings and providers utilizing standard or proprietary methodologies regardless of ownership or location.  This model provides for an extension of management and security control planes.  Consumers of Hybrid Clouds may be trusted or untrusted.

* Note: the benefits of elasticity don’t imply massive scale, which in many cases is not a relevant requirement for an enterprise.  Also, ultimately I deprecated the “managed” designation because it was a variation on a theme, but you can tell that ultimately the distinction I was going for between private and hybrid is the notion of OR versus AND designations in the various criteria.

AWS’ dedicated VPC options now give you another ‘OR’ option when thinking about who manages, owns the infrastructure your workloads run on, and more importantly where.  More specifically, the notion of ‘virtual’ cloud becomes less and less important as the hybrid nature of interconnectedness of resources starts to make more sense — regardless of whether you use overlay solutions like CloudSwitch, “integrated” solutions from vendors like VMware or Citrix or from AWS.  In the long term, the answer will probably be “D) all of the above.”

Providing dedicated compute atop a hypervisor for which you are the only tenant will be attractive to many enterprises who have trouble coming to terms with sharing memory/cpu resources with other customers.  This dedicated functionality costs a pretty penny – $87,600 a year, and as Simon Wardley pointed out that this has an interesting effect inasmuch as it puts a price tag on isolation:

Here’s the interesting thing that goes to the title of this post:

Is this a capability that AWS really expects to be utilized as they further blur the lines between public, private and hybrid cloud models OR is it a defensive strategy hinged on the exorbitant costs to further push enterprises into shared compute and overlay security models?

Specifically, one wonders if this is a strategically defensive or offensive move?

A single tenant atop a hypervisor atop dedicated hardware — that will go a long way toward addressing one concern: noisy (and nosy) neighbors.

Now, keep in mind that if an enterprise’s threat modeling and risk management frameworks are reasonably rational, they’ll realize that this is compute/memory isolation only.  Clearly the network and storage infrastructure is still shared, but the “state of the art” in today’s cloud of overlay encryption (file systems and SSL/IPSec VPNs) will likely address those issues.  Shared underlying cloud management/provisioning/orchestration is still an interesting area of concern.

So this will be an interesting play for AWS. Whether they’re using this to take a hammer to the existing private cloud models or just to add another dimension in service offering (logical, either way) I think in many cases enterprises will pay this tax to further satisfy compliance requirements by removing the compute multi-tenancy boogeyman.

/Hoff

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AWS’ New Networking Capabilities – Sucking Less ;)

March 15th, 2011 1 comment
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I still haven’t had my coffee and this is far from being complete analysis, but it’s pretty darned exciting…

One of the biggest challenges facing public Infrastructure-as-a-Service cloud providers has been balancing the flexibility and control of  datacenter networking capabilities against that present in traditional data center environments.

I’m not talking about complex L2/L3 configurations or converged data/storage networking topologies; I’m speaking of basic addressing and edge functionality (routing, VPN, firewall, etc.)  Furthermore, interconnecting public cloud compute/storage resources in a ‘private, non-Internet facing role) to a corporate datacenter has been less than easy.

Today Jeff Barr ahsploded another of his famous blog announcements which goes a long way solving not only these two issues, but clearly puts AWS on-track for continuing to press VMware on the overlay networking capabilities present in their vCloud Director vShield Edge/App model.

The press release (and Jeff’s blog) were a little confusing because they really focus on VPC, but the reality is that this runs much, much deeper.

I rather liked Shlomo Swidler’s response to that same comment to me on Twitter 🙂

This announcement is fundamentally about the underlying networking capabilities of EC2:

Today we are releasing a set of features that expand the power and value of the Virtual Private Cloud. You can think of this new collection of features as virtual networking for Amazon EC2. While I would hate to be innocently accused of hyperbole, I do think that today’s release legitimately qualifies as massive, one that may very well change that way that you think about EC2 and how it can be put to use in your environment.

The features include:

  • A new VPC Wizard to streamline the setup process for a new VPC.
  • Full control of network topology including subnets and routing.
  • Access controls at the subnet and instance level, including rules for outbound traffic.
  • Internet access via an Internet Gateway.
  • Elastic IP Addresses for EC2 instances within a VPC.
  • Support for Network Address Translation (NAT).
  • Option to create a VPC that does not have a VPC connection.

You can now create a network topology in the AWS cloud that closely resembles the one in your physical data center including public, private, and DMZ subnets. Instead of dealing with cables, routers, and switches you can design and instantiate your network programmatically. You can use the AWS Management Console (including a slick new wizard), the command line tools, or the APIs. This means that you could store your entire network layout in abstract form, and then realize it on demand.

That’s pretty bad-ass and goes along way toward giving enterprises a not-so-gentle kick in the butt regarding getting over the lack of network provisioning flexibility.  This will also shine whcn combined with the VMDK import capabilities — which are albeit limited today from a preservation of networking configuration.  Check out Christian Reilly’s great post “AWS – A Wonka Surprise” regarding how the VMDK-Import and overlay networking elements collide.  This gets right to the heart of what we were discussing.

Granted, I have not dug deeply into the routing capabilities (support for dynamic protocols, multiple next-hop gateways, etc.) or how this maps (if at all) to VLAN configurations and Shlomo did comment that there are limitations around VPC today that are pretty significant: “AWS VPC gotcha: No RDS, no ELB, no Route 53 in a VPC and “AWS VPC gotcha: multicast and broadcast still doesn’t work inside a VPC,” and “No Spot Instances, no Tiny Instances (t1.micro), and no Cluster Compute Instances (cc1.*)” but it’s an awesome first step that goes toward answering my pleas that I highlighted in my blog titled “Dear Public Cloud Providers: Please Make Your Networking Capabilities Suck Less. Kthxbye

Thank you, Santa. 🙂

On Twitter, Dan Glass’ assessment was concise, more circumspect and slightly less enthusiastic — though I’m not exactly sure I’d describe my reaction as that bordering on fanboi:

…to which I responded that clearly there is room for improvement in L3+ and security.  I expect we’ll see some 😉

In the long term, regardless of how this was framed from an announcement perspective, AWS’ VPC as a standalone “offer” should just go away – it will just become another networking configuration option.

While many of these capabilities are basic in nature, it just shows that AWS is paying attention to the fact that if it wants enterprise business, it’s going to have to start offering service capabilities that make the transition to their platforms more like what enterprises are used to using.

Great first step.

Now, about security…while outbound filtering via ACLs is cool and all…call me.

/Hoff

P.S. As you’ll likely see emerging in the comments, there are other interesting solutions to this overlay networking/connectivity solution – CohesiveF/T and CloudSwitch come to mind…

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Incomplete Thought: Cloud Capacity Clearinghouses & Marketplaces – A Security/Compliance/Privacy Minefield?

March 11th, 2011 2 comments
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With my focus on cloud security, I’m always fascinated when derivative business models arise that take the issues associated with “mainstream” cloud adoption and really bring issues of security, compliance and privacy into even sharper focus.

To wit, Enomaly recently launched SpotCloud – a Cloud Capacity Clearinghouse & Marketplace in which cloud providers can sell idle compute capacity and consumers may purchase said capacity based upon “…location, cost and quality.”

Got a VM-based workload?  Want to run it cheaply for a short period of time?

…Have any security/compliance/privacy requirements?

To me, “quality” means something different that simply availability…it means service levels, security, privacy, transparency and visibility.

Whilst one can select the geographic location where your VM will run, as part of offering an “opaque inventory,” the identity of the cloud provider is not disclosed.  This begs the question of how the suppliers are vetted and assessed for security, compliance and privacy.  According to the SpotCloud FAQ, the answer is only a vague “We fully vet all market participants.”

There are two very interesting question/answer pairings on the SpotCloud FAQ that relate to security and service availability:

How do I secure my SpotCloud VM?

User access to VM should be disabled for increased security. The VM package is typically configured to automatically boot, self configure itself and phone home without the need for direct OS access. VM examples available.

Are there any SLA’s, support or guarantees?

No, to keep the costs as low as possible the service is offered without any SLA, direct support or guarantees. We may offer support in the future. Although we do have a phone and are more than happy to talk to you…

:: shudder ::

For now, I would assume that this means that if your workloads are at all mission critical, sensitive, subject to compliance requirements or traffic in any sort of sensitive data, this sort of exchange option may not be for you. I don’t have data on the use cases for the workloads being run using SpotCloud, but perhaps we’ll see Enomaly make this information more available as time goes on.

I would further assume that the criteria for provider selection might be expanded to include certification, compliance and security capabilities — all the more reason for these providers to consider something like CloudAudit which would enable them to provide supporting materials related to their assertions. (*wink*)

To be clear, from a marketplace perspective, I think this is a really nifty idea — sort of the cloud-based SETI-for-cost version of the Mechanical Turk.  It takes the notion of “utility” and really makes one think of the options.  I remember thinking the same thing when Zimory launched their marketplace in 2009.

I think ultimately this further amplifies the message that we need to build survivable systems, write secure code and continue to place an emphasis on the security of information deployed using cloud services. Duh-ja vu.

This sort of use case also begs the interesting set of questions as to what these monolithic apps are intended to provide — surely they transit in some sort of information — information that comes from somewhere?  The oft-touted massively scaleable compute “front-end” overlay of public cloud often times means that the scale-out architectures leveraged to deliver service connect back to something else…

You likely see where this is going…

At any rate, I think these marketplace offerings will, for the foreseeable future, serve a specific type of consumer trafficking in specific types of information/service — it’s yet another vertical service offering that cloud can satisfy.

What do you think?

/Hoff

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App Stores: From Mobile Platforms To VMs – Ripe For Abuse

March 2nd, 2011 4 comments
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This CNN article titled “Google pulls 21 apps in Android malware scare” describes an alarming trend in which malicious code is embedded in applications which are made available for download and use on mobile platforms:

Google has just pulled 21 popular free apps from the Android Market. According to the company, the apps are malware aimed at getting root access to the user’s device, gathering a wide range of available data, and downloading more code to it without the user’s knowledge.

Although Google has swiftly removed the apps after being notified (by the ever-vigilant “Android Police” bloggers), the apps in question have already been downloaded by at least 50,000 Android users.

The apps are particularly insidious because they look just like knockoff versions of already popular apps. For example, there’s an app called simply “Chess.” The user would download what he’d assume to be a chess game, only to be presented with a very different sort of app.

Wow, 50,000 downloads.  Most of those folks are likely blissfully unaware they are owned.

In my Cloudifornication presentation, I highlighted that the same potential for abuse exists for “virtual appliances” which can be uploaded for public consumption to app stores and VM repositories such as those from VMware and Amazon Web Services:

The feasibility for this vector was deftly demonstrated shortly afterward by the guys at SensePost (Clobbering the Cloud, Blackhat) who showed the experiment of uploading a non-malicious “phone home” VM to AWS which was promptly downloaded and launched…

This is going to be a big problem in the mobile space and potentially just as impacting in cloud/virtual datacenters as people routinely download and put into production virtual machines/virtual appliances, the provenance and integrity of which are questionable.  Who’s going to police these stores?

(update: I loved Christian Reilly’s comment on Twitter regarding this: “Using a public AMI is the equivalent of sharing a syringe”)

/Hoff

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Video Of My CSA Presentation: “Commode Computing: Relevant Advances In Toiletry & I.T. – From Squat Pots to Cloud Bots – Waste Management Through Security Automation”

February 19th, 2011 13 comments

This is probably my most favorite presentation I have given.  It was really fun.  I got so much positive feedback on what amounts to a load of crap. 😉

This video is from the Cloud Security Alliance Summit at the 2011 RSA Security Conference in San Francisco.  I followed Mark Benioff from Salesforce and Vivek Kundra, CIO of the United States.

Here is a PDF of the slides if you are interested.

Part 1:

Part 2:

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My Warm-Up Acts at the RSA/Cloud Security Alliance Summit Are Interesting…

February 8th, 2011 2 comments
Red and Yellow, two of M&M's

Besides a panel or two and another circus-act talk with Rich Mogull, I’m thrilled to be invited to present again at the Cloud Security Alliance Summit at RSA this year.

One of my previous keynotes at a CSA event was well received: Cloudersize – A cardio, strength & conditioning program for a firmer, more toned *aaS

Normally when negotiating to perform at such a venue, I have my people send my diva list over to the conference organizers.  You know, the normal stuff: only red M&M’s, Tupac walkout music, fuzzy blue cashmere slippers and Hoffaccinos on tap in the green room.

This year, understanding we are all under pressure given the tough economic climate, I relaxed my requirements and instead took a deal for a couple of ace warm-up speakers to goose the crowd prior to my arrival.

Here’s who Jim managed to scrape up:

9:00AM – 9:40AM // Keynote: “Cloud 2: Proven, Trusted and Secure”
Speaker: Marc Benioff, CEO, Salesforce.com

9:40AM – 10:10AM // Keynote: Vivek Kundra, CIO, White House

10:10AM – 10:30AM // Presentation: “Commode Computing: Relevant Advances In Toiletry – From Squat Pots to Cloud Bots – Waste Management Through Security Automation”
Presenting: Christofer Hoff, Director, Cloud & Virtualization Solutions, Cisco Systems

I guess I can’t complain 😉

See you there. Bring rose petals and Evian as token gifts to my awesomeness, won’t you?

/Hoff

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CloudPassage & Why Guest-Based Footprints Matter Even More For Cloud Security

February 1st, 2011 4 comments
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Every day for the last week or so after their launch, I’ve been asked left and right about whether I’d spoken to CloudPassage and what my opinion was of their offering.  In full disclosure, I spoke with them when they were in stealth almost a year ago and offered some guidance as well as the day before their launch last week.

Disappointing as it may be to some, this post isn’t really about my opinion of CloudPassage directly; it is, however, the reaffirmation of the deployment & delivery models for the security solution that CloudPassage has employed.  I’ll let you connect the dots…

Specifically, in public IaaS clouds where homogeneity of packaging, standardization of images and uniformity of configuration enables scale, security has lagged.  This is mostly due to the fact that for a variety of reasons, security itself does not scale (well.)

In an environment where the underlying platform cannot be counted upon to provide “hooks” to integrate security capabilities in at the “network” level, all that’s left is what lies inside the VM packaging:

  1. Harden and protect the operating system [and thus the stuff atop it,]
  2. Write secure applications and
  3. Enforce strict, policy-driven information-centric security.

My last presentation, “Cloudinomicon: Idempotent Infrastructure, Building Survivable Systems and Bringing Sexy Back to Information Centricity” addressed these very points. [This one is a version I delivered at the University of Michigan Security Summit]

If we focus on the first item in that list, you’ll notice that generally to effect policy in the guest, you must have a footprint on said guest — however thin — to provide the hooks that are needed to either directly effect policy or redirect back to some engine that offloads this functionality.  There’s a bit of marketing fluff associated with using the word “agentless” in many applications of this methodology today, but at some point, the endpoint needs some sort of “agent” to play*

So that’s where we are today.  The abstraction offered by virtualized public IaaS cloud platforms is pushing us back to the guest-centric-based models of yesteryear.

This will bring challenges with scale, management, efficacy, policy convergence between physical and virtual and the overall API-driven telemetry driven by true cloud solutions.

You can read more about this in some of my other posts on the topic:

Finally, since I used them for eyeballs, please do take a look at CloudPassage — their first (free) offerings are based upon leveraging small footprint Linux agents and a cloud-based SaaS “grid” to provide vulnerability management, and firewall/zoning in public cloud environments.

/Hoff

* There are exceptions to this rule depending upon *what* you’re trying to do, such as anti-malware offload via a hypervisor API, but this is not generally available to date in public cloud.  This will, I hope, one day soon change.

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Revisiting Virtualization & Cloud Stack Security – Back to the Future (Baked In Or Bolted On?)

January 17th, 2011 No comments

[Like a good w[h]ine, this post goes especially well with a couple of other courses such as Hack The Stack Or Go On a Bender With a Vendor?, Incomplete Thought: Why Security Doesn’t Scale…Yet, What’s The Problem With Cloud Security? There’s Too Much Of It…, Incomplete Thought: The Other Side Of Cloud – Where The (Wild) Infrastructure Things Are… and Where Are the Network Virtual Appliances? Hobbled By the Virtual Network, That’s Where…]

There are generally three dichotomies of thought when it comes to the notion of how much security should fall to the provider of the virtualization or cloud stack versus that of the consumer of their services or a set of third parties:

  1. The virtualization/cloud stack provider should provide a rich tapestry of robust security capabilities “baked in” to the platform itself, or
  2. The virtualization/cloud stack provider should provide security-enabling hooks to enable an ecosystem of security vendors to provide the bulk of security (beyond isolation) to be “bolted on,” or
  3. The virtualization/cloud stack provider should maximize the security of the underlying virtualization/cloud platform and focus on API security, isolation and availability of service only while pushing the bulk of security up into the higher-level programatic/application layers, or

So where are we today?  How much security does the stack, itself, need to provide. The answer, however polarized, is somewhere in the murkiness dictated by the delivery models, deployment models, who owns what part of the real estate and the use cases of both the virtualization/cloud stack provider and ultimately the consumer.

I’ve had a really interesting series of debates with the likes of Simon Crosby (of Xen/Citrix fame) on this topic and we even had a great debate at RSA with Steve Herrod from VMware.  These two “infrastructure” companies and their solutions typify the diametrically opposed first two approaches to answering this question while cloud providers who own their respective custom-rolled “stacks” at either end of IaaS and SaaS spectrums such as Amazon Web Services and Salesforce bringing up the third.

As with anything, this is about the tenuous balance of “security,” compliance, cost, core competence and maturity of solutions coupled with the sensitivity of the information that requires protection and the risk associated with the lopsided imbalance that occurs in the event of loss.

There’s no single best answer which explains why were have three very different approaches to what many, unfortunately, view as the same problem.

Today’s “baked in” security capabilities aren’t that altogether mature or differentiated, the hooks and APIs that allow for diversity and “defense in depth” provide for new and interesting ways to instantiate security, but also add to complexity, driving us back to an integration play.  The third is looked upon as proprietary and limiting in terms of visibility and transparency and don’t solve problems such as application and information security any more than the other two do.

Will security get “better” as we move forward with virtualization and cloud computing.  Certainly.  Perhaps because of it, perhaps in spite of it.

One thing’s for sure, it’s going to be messy, despite what the marketing says.

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The Cloud As a (Hax0r’s) Calculator. Yawn…

January 11th, 2011 2 comments
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If I see another news story that talks about how a “hacker” has shown that by “utilizing the cloud” to harness compute on demand to do what otherwise one might use a botnet or specialized hardware to perform BUT otherwise suggest that it somehow compromises an entire branch of technology, I’m going to…

Meh.

Yeah, cloud makes this cheap and accessible…rainbow table cracking using IaaS images via a cloud provider…passwords, wifi creds, credit card numbers, pi…

Please.

See:

Researcher cracks Wi-Fi passwords with Amazon cloud

Using Cloud Computing To Crack Passwords – Amazon’s EC2

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