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More On Clouds & Botnets: MeatClouds, CloudFlux, LeapFrog, EDoS and More!

March 13th, 2009 6 comments

After my "Frogs" talk at Source Boston yesterday, Adam O'Donnell and I chatted about one of my chuckle slides I threw up in the presentation in which I give some new names to some (perhaps not new) attack/threat scenarios which involve Cloud Computing:

CloudSecBingo.058

  • MeatCloud - Essentially abusing Amazon's Mechanical Turk and using it to produce the Cloud version of a sweat shop; exploiting the ignorant for fun and profit to perform menial illegal muling tasks on your behalf…think SETI meets underage garment workers…
  • CloudFlux – Take a mess of stolen credit cards, open up  a slew of Amazon AWS accounts using them, build/scale to thousands of instances overnight, launch carpet bomb attack (you choose,) tear it down/have it torn down, and move your botnet elsewhere…rinse, lather, repeat…
  • LeapFrog – As we move to hybrid private/public clouds and load balancing/cloudbursting across multiple cloud providers, we'll interconnect Clouds via VPNs to the "trusted internals" of your Cloudbase… Attackers will thank us by abusing these tunnels to penetrate your assets through the, uh, back door.
  • vMotion Poison Potion – When VMware's vCloud makes its appearance and we start to allow vMotion across datacenters and across Clouds (in the clear?,) imagine the fun we'll have as we see attacks against vMotion protocols and VM state…  
  • EDoS – Economic Denial of Sustainability – Covered previously here

Adam mentioned that I might have considered that Botnets were a great example of a Cloud-based service and wrote a very cool piece about it on ZDNet here.

I remembered after the fact that I wrote a related blog on the topic several months ago titled "Cloud Computing: Invented by Criminals, Secured by ???" as a rif on something Reuven Cohen wrote.

/Hoff
Categories: Cloud Computing, Cloud Security Tags:

Source Boston – Video Interviews of Security Rockstars…

March 13th, 2009 3 comments

Sourcelogo
Source Boston has officially wound down, but I’m still on Cloud 9 (sorry) following the amazing sessions and interaction I had with my fellow attendees and speakers.

 

My presentation was well received and with Marcus Ranum, Dan Geer, and Adam Shostack sitting six feet in front of me, I didn’t choke as badly as I could have.  I had a ton of fun giving this first run preso and got a lot of great feedback and questions. 

One of the most excellent things I got to do was spend some time walking about with Zach Lanier (@quine on Twitter) and interview many of the vendors and speakers extemporaneously on various subjects.

 

I’ll be updating this post with links to the interviews as I get them cleaned up and uploaded.

 

Here’s a sampling of what you can expect:
  • David Mortman, “I Can Haz Privacy”
  • Dmitry McKay, LogLogic
  • Chris Wysopal – Veracode 
  • Peter Kuper – “Silver Linings”
  • Jose Nazario, Arbor, “Politically Motivated DDoS Attacks” 
  • Jeremiah Grossman, Whitehat Security, “Get Rich or Die Trying, Making Money the Black Hat Way”
  • Amrit Williams, BigFix, “The Economics of CyberCrime & the Law of Malware Probability”  
  • Adam Shostack, Microsoft, “The Crisis In Information Security”  
  • Dan Kaminsky, IOActive, “DNS – Toward a Secure Infrastructure” 
  • Chris Weber, Casaba Security, “Exploiting Unicode-Enabled Software”  
  • Rob Cheyne, SafeLight, “The End Of Our Rope: The On-Going Discussion Between Business & Security” 

You’ll laugh, you’ll cry, you’ll wonder why people gave me this task…

 

But seriously, we discuss such mega-issues such as DDoS, Snuggies, Bedazzlers, Zombies and Estonian dissident groups (and that’s in just ONE of the talks.)  

 

I think I’ve found something I absolutely LOVE doing — vlogging (video blogging) and will try and do more of it.

 

Check back for updates to the links over the weekend.

 

/Hoff

 

Categories: Security Conferences Tags:

Oh Noes: We Can’t Monitor/Protect Against Intra-VM Traffic!

March 10th, 2009 4 comments

Angryguy
I got a press release in my inbox this morning that made me cringe.  It came from a vendor who produces a "purpose-built virtual firewall."

The press release details a customer case study that I found typical of how security solutions are being marketed in the virtualization space today, which again is really more about visibility than pure "security" and preys mostly on poor planning and fundamental issues stemming from treating "security" like a band-aid instead of an element of enterprise architecture.


When we start to cross the streams as to the realities of virtualization, the security implications thereof and making promises to solve problems with products which may or may not be deserving of investment given an assessment of risk, especially in today's trying economic climate, it makes me cranky.


I'm just tiring of the mixing of metaphors in the marketing of these "solutions."


I was specifically annoyed by a couple of statements in the press release and since I haven't had my coffee, I thought I'd point out a few to further underscore what I present in my Four Horsemen presentation regarding where we are in the solution continuum today.


To wit:

[Customer] has selected the [Vendor's] virtual firewall to secure its virtual environment and mitigate an attack before it could hit their network. 

Given the fact that to get to a VM you generally have to (1) utilize the physical network and (2) transit the vSwitch in the VMM, the reality is that an attack has already "hit their network" long before it gets to the VM or the virtual firewall, at least given today's available offerings.  There is no magic security fairy dust that will mitigate an attack presciently.


If you put VM's into production that are already infected, you have other problems to solve…

After moving our production applications to a virtualized environment we realized that we lacked security; I had no visibility into what was going on between VMs and a virtual attack could take down our network,” said [Customer.]  “We sought the same level of security for our virtual environment that we had with our physical network.”

This indicates a lack of proper risk management and planning on the part of the [Customer.]  Further, it underscores an example I use in the Four Horsemen which concerns which tools in a multi-server physical deployment did the [Customer] use to monitor/protect in-line traffic between these physical machines? 

The {Customer] must have done this since the press release suggests they demand the "…same level of security for [their] virtual environment that [they] had with [their] physical network."


Did the [Customer] have each physical server on it's own VLAN/subnet, isolated with firewalls?  Did he SPAN every single port to an IDS/IPS?
 If not, what's the difference here?  The Hypervisor?  What protection mechanisms has the fancy virtual firewall put in place to protect it?  None.

[Customer] was increasingly concerned about the risks of virtual networks, which range from security policy violations such as mixing trusted and un-trusted systems to malware exploits that can propagate undetected within a virtual network. 

Based upon the second paragraph above where the [Customer] admitted they put their virtualized environment into production without visibility or security, they clearly weren't that concerned with the risks.

A large amount of data center network traffic was moving between VMs and [Customer] had no visibility or control over the communication on the virtual network.

So if there were no security or visibility tools in place, how was it determined that traffic was moving between VM's?


Does this mean that all the customer's VM's were in a single VLAN and not segmented? If not and vSwitch configurations via port groups and VLANs were configured around VM criticality, role or function, then they certainly had some insight into what was moving between VM's and the "data center," right?


I must be confused. 

[Customer's] traditional network security tools could not monitor, analyze or troubleshoot inter-VM traffic because communications between VMs on the same physical host never touch the traditional network

Assuming that the VM's weren't in a single VLAN/portgroup on a single vSwitch and instead were segmented via VLANs/subnets, then the only way to get traffic from VLAN/IP Subnet A to VLAN/IP Subnet B (and thus VM A to VM B in these VLAN's) is though a layer 3 routing process which generally means traffic exits the virtual network and hits the physical network…where said "traditional security tools" could see it.


Of course, this doesn't help intra-VM traffic on the same portgroup/VLAN/vSwitch, but that's not what they pointed to above, but assuming they don't look at inter-machine traffic in their physical network on the same VLAN, again I ask what's the difference?

VMs were able to communicate with each other without observation or policy-based inspection and filtering, which left them highly vulnerable to malicious exploits. Additionally, worms and viruses could further spread among physical hosts via unintentional VMotion of an infected VM.

Back to my point above about how the [Customer] monitored traffic between physical hosts…if you don't do it in physical environments, why the fret in the virtual?

Oh and "unintentional VMotion!?" ZOMG!  For a VM to be "infected," excluding direct physical access, wouldn't the threat vector be the network in the first place?  

The [Vendor] virtual firewall was specifically created to mitigate the risks of virtual networks, while maintaining the ROI of virtualization.

What "risks of virtual networks" does this product mitigate in the absence of vulnerability or clearly defined threats that aren't faced in the physical realm?  Let me tell you.  It goes back to the very valid claim that you get better visibility given the integration with the virtualization platform configuration managers to call attention to when CHANGE occurs.

This is the real value of products like this from [Vendor.]  I
n the long run, the big boys who make mature firewalls and IPS products will get to harness API's like VMsafe and combined with the compartmentalization and segmentation capabilities of vShield Zones leaves a very short runway for products like this.

I'm not suggesting that products like this from [Vendor] don't offer value and solve an immediate pain point. I'd even consider deploying them to solve very specific problems I might have, but then again, I know what problem I'd be trying to solve. ROI?  Oy.

However, unlike the picture painted of the [Customer] above, I plan a little better and understand the impact virtualization has on my security posture and how that factors into my assessment and management of risk BEFORE I put it into production.  You should too.


</rant>


{Ed: I use 'intra-' instead of 'inter-' to reflect the "internal" passing of traffic between VM's using the vSwitch. Should traffic exit the vSwitch/host and hit the network as part of interchange between two VM's, I'd count this as 'inter-" VM traffic.}

Categories: Virtualization Tags:

Sun vs. Cisco? I’m Getting My Popcorn…

March 9th, 2009 6 comments

Popcorn
Scott Lowe wrote an interesting blog today wondering if Sun was preparing to take on Cisco in the virtualization space, referencing the development of virtualized networking functionality featuring the novel combination of commodity hardware and open source software to unseat the Jolly Green Giant:

A while back in Virtualization Short Take #25 I briefly mentioned Sun’s Crossbow network virtualization software, which brings new possibilities to the Solaris networking world. Not being a Solaris expert, it was hard for me at the time to really understand why Solaris fans were so excited about it; since then, though, I’ve come to understand that Crossbow brings to Solaris the same kind of full-blown virtual network interfaces and such that I use daily with VMware ESX. Now I’m beginning to understand why people are so thrilled!

In any case, an astute reader picked up on my mention of Crossbow and pointed me to this article by Jonathan Schwartz of Sun, and in particular this phrase:

You’re going to see an accelerating series of announcements over the coming year, from amplifying our open source storage offerings, to building out an equivalent portfolio of products in the networking space…

That seemingly innocuous mention was then coupled with this blog post and the result was this question: is Sun preparing to take on Cisco? Is Sun getting ready to try to use commodity hardware and open source software to penetrate the networking market in the same way that they are using commodity hardware and open source software to try to further penetrate the storage market with their open storage products (in particular, the 7000 series)?

It’s an interesting thought, to say the least. Going up against Cisco is a bold move, though, and I question Sun’s staying power in that sort of battle. Of course, with Cisco potentially distracted by the swirling rumors regarding the networking giant’s entry into the server market, now may be the best time to make this move.

It's really the last paragraph that is of interest to me, specifically the boldfaced sentence I highlighted.  I think the "rumors" have pretty much been substantiated by the mainstream press, so let's assume "California" is going to happen.

Let's make a couple of things really, really clear:
  1. I don't know how anyone can think that Cisco is "distracted" by bringing to market the logical extension of virtualized infrastructure — the compute function — as anything other than a shrewd business decision to offer a complete end-to-end solution to customers.  I talked about it here in blog post titled "Cisco Is NOT Getting Into the Server Business…" This is an Enterprise Architecture play, pure and simple.
  2. Honestly, if we're discussing commoditization, a server is a server is a server, whether it's in a blade form factor or not, and it's not like Cisco has to worry about building things from scratch. The availability of OEM/ODM components (raw or otherwise) means they don't have to start from scratch.  Oh yes, I know HP spent a bazillion dollars on C-Class fan engineering and IBM's BCHT is teh awesome and…
  3. The whole game is Unified Computing; bringing together enterprise class compute, network and storage as a solution with integrated virtualization, management and intelligence; you take the biggest pain point out of the equation — integration — and you drive down cost while increasing utility, agility and efficiency.
  4. If you look at what "California" is slated to deliver it's hard to see how Sun would compete: A blade based chassis with integrated Nexus converged networking/storage, integrated virtualization from VMware (with Nexus/VN-Link,) and management from BMC.  You know, Enterprise stuff, not integration hodge podge. 

So, I ask, does this look like a distraction to you? 

I'm not knocking Sun (or Scott to be clear,) but if I were they, I'd be much more worried about HP or IBM or even Microsoft and Redhat.

I'm grabbing my popcorn, but this battle might be over before the kernels (ha!) start popping.

/Hoff
Categories: Virtualization Tags:

Cloud Computing Not Ready For Prime Time?

March 9th, 2009 4 comments

I just read another in a never-ending series of articles that takes a polarized view of Cloud Computing and its readiness for critical applications and data.

In the ComputerWorld article titled "Cloud computing not ready for critical apps,", Craig Steadman and Patrick Thibodeau present some very telling quotes from CIO's of some large enterprises regarding their reticence toward utilizing "Cloud Computing" and it's readiness for their mission critical needs.

The reasons are actually quite compelling, and I speak to them (and more) in my latest Cloud Computing presentation which I am giving at Source Boston this week:

Frogs-Draft.056

Reliability, availability and manageability are all potential show-stoppers for the CIO's in this article, but these are issues of economic and adoptive context that don't present the entire picture. 

What do I mean?

At the New England Cloud Computing Users' Group, a Cloud-based startup called Pixily presented on their use of Amazon's AWS services. They painted an eye-opening business case which detailed the agility and tremendous cost savings that the "Cloud" offers.  "The Cloud" provides them with reduced time-to-market, no up-front capital expenditures and allows them to focus on their core competencies. 

All awesome stuff.

I asked them about how their use of AWS and what amounted to a sole-source service provider did to their disaster recovery, redundancy/resiliency and risk management processes.  They had to admit that the day they went live with feature coverage on the front page of several newspapers also happened to be the day that Amazon suffered an 8 hour outage, and thus, so did they.

Now, for a startup, the benefits often outweigh the risks associated for downtime and vendor lock-in. For an established enterprise with cutthroat service levels, regulatory pressures and demanding customers who won't/can't tolerate outages, this is not the case.

Today we're suffering from issues surrounding the fact that emerging offerings in Cloud Computing are simply not mature if what you're looking for involves the holistic and cohesive management, reliability, resilience and transparency across suppliers of Cloud services.

We will get there as adoption increases and businesses start to lean on providers to create and adopt standards that answer the issues above, but today if you're an enterprise who needs five 9's, you may come to the same conclusion as the CIO's in the CW article.  If you're an SME/SMB/Startup, you may find everything you need in the Cloud.

It's important, however, to keep a balanced, realistic and contextual perspective when addressing Cloud Computing and its readiness — and yours — for critical applications.  Polarizing the discussion to one hyperbolic end or the other is not really helpful.

/Hoff

Categories: Cloud Computing, Cloud Security Tags:

If Virtualization is a Religion, Does That Make Cloud a Cult?

March 9th, 2009 No comments

Skyfalling-angled
I had just finished reading Virtual Gipsy's post titled "VMware as religion" when my RSS reader featured a referential post from VM/ETC's Rich titled "vTheology: the study of virtualization as religion."

While I appreciated the humor surrounding the topic, I try never to mix friends politics, and religion* so I'll not wade into the deep end on this one except to suggest what my title asks: 

If virtualization is a religion, does that make cloud a cult?

If so, to whom do I send my tidings?  Who is the Cardinal of the Cloud?  The Pope of PaaS?  The Shaman of Service?

/Hoff

*…and truth be told, I'm not feeling particularly witty this morning.

Incomplete Thought: Offensive Computing – The Empire Strikes Back

March 5th, 2009 11 comments

Failure
Yesterday at IANS, Greg Shipley gave a great keynote that focused on a lot of things we do today in InfoSec that aren't necessarily as effective as they should be. Greg called for a change in our behavior as a community to address the gaps we have.

In the Q&A section, it occurred to me that for the sake of argument, I would ask Greg about his thoughts on changing our behavior and position in dealing with security and our adversaries by positing that instead of always playing defense, we should play some offense.

I didn't constrain what I meant by "offense" other to suggest that it could include "active countermeasures," but what is obvious is that people immediately throw up walls around being "offensive" without spending much time defining what it actually means.

I've written and spoken about this before, but it's a rather contentious issue. It gets shelved pretty quickly by most but it really shouldn't in my opinion.

In a follow-on discussion after the keynote, Marcus Ranum, Richard Bejtlich, Rocky DeStefano and I were standing around shooting the, uh, stuff, when I brought this up again.

We had a really interesting dialog wherein we explored what "offensive computing" meant to each of us and it was clear that simply playing defense alone would never allow us to do anything more than spend money and hope.

There's not been a war yet that has been won with defense alone, so why do we expect we can win this one by simply piling on more barbed wire when the enemy is dropping smart bombs? This is the definition of insanity and a behavior that we don't talk about changing.

"Don't spend money on AV because it's not effective" is an interesting behavioral change from the perspective of how you invest. Don't lay down and take it up the assets by only playing defense is another.

I'm being intentionally vague, obtuse and non-specific when it comes to defining what I mean by "offensive," but we're at a point in time where at a minimum we have the technology and capability to add a little "offense" to our defense.  

You want a change in behavior?  How about not playing the victim?

What are your thoughts on "offensive computing?"  

/Hoff
Categories: Offensive Computing Tags:

Ron Popeil and Cloud Computing In Poetic Review…

February 27th, 2009 No comments

Popeil

The uptake of computing
using the cloud,
would make the king of all marketeers
— Ron Popeil — proud

He's the guy who came out
with the canned spray on hair,
the oven you set and forget
without care

He had the bass fishing rod
you could fit in your pocket,
the Veg-O-Matic appliance
with which you could chop it

Mr. Microphone, it seems, 
was ahead of its time
Karaoke meets Facebook
Oh, how divine!

The smokeless ashtray,
the Cap Snaffler, drain buster
selling you all of the crap
Infomercials could muster

His inventions solved problems
some common, some new
If you ordered them quickly
he might send you two!

Back to the Cloud
and how it's related
to the many wonders
that Sir Ron has created

The cloud fulfills promises
that IT has made:
agility, better service
at a lower pay grade

You can scale up, scale down
pay for just what you use
Elastic infrastructure
what you get's what you choose

We've got public and private,

outside and in,

on-premise, off-premise

thick platforms or thin

The offerings are flooding
the wires en masse
Everything, it now seems,
is some sort of *aaS

You've got infrastructure,
platforms, software and storage.
Integration, SOA 
with full vendor whoreage

Some folks equate
virtualization with cloud
The platform providers
shout this vision out loud

'Course the OS contingent
has something to say
that cloud and virt
is part of their play

However you see it,
and whatever its form
the Cloud's getting bigger
it's starting to storm

Raining down on us all
is computational glory
but I wonder, dear friends,
'bout the end of this story

Will the Cloud truly bring value?
Solve problems that matter?
Or is it about 
vendors' wallets a-fatter?

*I* think the Cloud
has wonderful promise
If the low-hanging IT fruit
can be lifted 'way from us

The Cloud is a function
that's forging new thought
Pushing the boundaries
and theories we've bought

It's profoundly game changing

and as long as we focus

and don't buy into the 

hyped hocus pocus

So before we end up
with a Cloud that "slices and dices"
that never gets dull,
mashes, grates, grinds and rices

It's important to state

what problem we're solving

so the Cloud doesn't end up

with its value de-evolving

—-

BTW, if you want to see more of my Cloud and Security poems, just check here.

I’m Sorry, But Did Someone Redefine “Open” and “Interoperable” and Not Tell Me?

February 26th, 2009 3 comments

3-stooges-football
I've got a problem with the escalation of VMware's marketing abuse of the terms "open," "interoperable," and "standards."  I'm a fan of VMware, but this is getting silly.


When a vendor like VMware crafts an architecture, creates a technology platform, defines an API, gets providers to subscribe to offering it as a service and does so with the full knowledge that it REQUIRES their platform to really function, and THEN calls it "open" and "interoperable," because an API exists, it is intellectually dishonest and about as transparent as saran wrap to call that a "standard" to imply it is available regardless of platform.


We are talking about philosophically and diametrically-opposed strategies between virtualization platform players here, not minor deltas along the bumpy roadmap highway.  What's at stake is fundamentally the success or failure of these companies.  Trying to convince the world that VMware, Microsoft, Citrix, etc. are going to huddle for a group hug is, well, insulting.

This recent article in the Register espousing VMware's strategy really highlighted some of these issues as it progressed. Here's the first bit which I agree with:

There is, they fervently say, no other enterprise server and data centre virtualisation play in town. Businesses wanting to virtualise their servers inside a virtualising data centre infrastructure have to dance according to VMware's tune. Microsoft's Hyper-V music isn't ready, they say, and open source virtualisation is lagging and doesn't have enterprise credibility.

Short of the hyperbole, I'd agree with most of that.  We can easily start a religious debate here, but let's not for now.  It gets smelly where the article starts talking about vCloud which, given VMware's protectionist stance based on fair harbor tactics, amounts to nothing more (still) than a vision.  None of the providers will talk about it because they are under NDA.  We don't really know what vCloud means yet: 

Singing the vcloud API standard song is very astute. It reassures all people already on board and climbing on board the VMware bandwagon that VMware is open and not looking to lock them in. Even if Microsoft doesn't join in this standardisation effort with a whole heart, it doesn't matter so long as VMware gets enough critical mass.

How do you describe having to use VMware's platform and API as VMware "…not looking to lock them in?" Of course they are!  

To fully leverage the power of the InterCloud in this model, it really amounts to either an ALL VMware solution or settling for basic connectors for coarse-grained networked capability.

Unless you have feature-parity or true standardization at the hypervisor and management layers, it's really about interconnectivity not interoperability.  Let's be honest about this.

By having external cloud suppliers and internal cloud users believe that cloud federation through VMware's vCloud infrastructure is realistic then the two types of cloud user will bolster and reassure each other. They want it to happen and, if it does, then Hyper-V is locked out unless it plays by the VMware-driven and VMware partner-supported cloud standardisation rules, in which case MIcrosoft's cloud customers are open to competitive attack. It's unlikely to happen.

"Federation" in this context really only applies to lessening/evaporating the difference between public and private clouds, not clouds running on different platforms.  That's, um, "lock-in."


Standards are great, especially when they're yours. Now we're starting to play games.  VMware should basically just kick their competitors in the nuts and say this to us all:

"If you standardize on VMware, you get to leverage the knowledge, skills, and investment you've already made — regardless of whether you're talking public vs. private.  We will make our platforms, API's and capabilities as available as possible.  If the other vendors want to play, great.  If not, your choice as a customer will determine if that was a good decision for them or not."

Instead of dancing around trying to muscle Microsoft into playing nice (which they won't) or insulting our intelligence by handwaving that you're really interested in free love versus world domination, why don't you just call a spade a virtualized spade.

And by the way, if it weren't for Microsoft, we wouldn't have this virtualization landscape to begin with…not because of the technology contributions to virtualization, but rather because the inefficiencies of single app/OS/hardware affinity using Microsoft OS's DROVE the entire virtualization market in the first place!

Microsoft is no joke.  They will maneuver to outpace VMware. HyperV and Azure will be a significant threat to VMware in the long term, and this old Microsoft joke will come back to haunt to VMware's abuse of the words above:

Q: How many Microsoft engineers does it take to change a lightbulb?  
A: None, they just declare darkness a standard.

is it getting dimmer in here?


/Hoff

Amazon’s Kindle: Some Interesting Security Thoughts

February 26th, 2009 13 comments

My Kindle2 showed up yesterday. I un-boxed it, turned it on and within 3 minutes had downloaded my first book and was reading away (Thomas Barnett's "Great Powers," if you must know.)

So this morning after I checked my email on my other indispensable tool/toy, my iPhone, I realized something was missing from the Kindle: a password.

So you might think "Hoff, why would you need a password for a device that lets you read books?'

Well, while it's true that the majority of users will simply read "off-the-shelf" books/blogs/magazines they download from Amazon.com's storefront on their Kindles, there are a couple of other interesting scenarios that ran through my mind:
  1. To purchase a book using the Kindle, the device is linked to Amazon's One-Click purchase capability.  This means that once I choose to purchase a book, I simply click "Buy" and it's delivered to the device, automagically charging my credit card.  If I lost my device, someone who found it could literally download hundreds of books to the Kindle on my nickel until I am able to do something about it.  This would be short-lived, but really annoying.
  2. It is possible using an Amazon web service to convert documents into the Kindle Format and download them over WhisperNet to your device.  Given how convenient this is for reading, imagine what would happen if some crafty person decided to convert and download a sensitive document to the Kindle and then lose the device.  Imagine if that document contained PII or other confidential/sensitive information?  I wager we'll see a breach notification being issued based on someone losing a Kindle.
Yes, I know it's a piece of "consumer" equipment, but look a little further down the line: college students using it for textbooks and all sorts of other communications, business people using it for reading corporate materials, etc…

I am interested in exploring the following elements in the long term:
  1. An option for password-protected access to the device itself.
  2. A content-rating based password-controlled parental rating system for certain materials. My kids already grabbed my Kindle and (see #1 above) downloaded 3 kids books to it.  I may not want them to read certain content.
  3. Remote self-destruct 
  4. Encryption of content (at rest, in motion)
  5. Security of Whispernet itself
  6. WiFi (and it's attendant issues)
I'm sure as I dwell on this, there will be other issues that crop up, but the security wonk in me was in full gear this morning.

You have any other security shortcomings or concerns you've thought of re: the Kindle? 

/Hoff
Categories: Uncategorized Tags: