Rational Survivability

When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail…

A couple of days ago, I was concerned (here) that I had missed Don Weber’s point (here)
regarding how he thinks solutions like UTM that consolidate multiple
security functions into a single solution increased complexity and
increased risk.

I was interested in more detail regarding Don’s premise for his argument, so I asked him for some substantiating background information before I responded:

The question I have for Don is simple: how is it that you’ve
arrived at the conclusion that the consolidation and convergence of
security functionality from multiple discrete products into a
single-sourced solution adds "complexity" and leads to "increased risk?"

Can you empirically demonstrate this by giving us an example of
where a single function security device that became a multiple function
security product caused this complete set combination of events to occur:

1. Product complexity increased
2. Lead to a vulnerability that was exploitable and
3. Increased "risk" based upon business impact and exposure

Don was kind enough to respond to my request with a rather lengthy
post titled "The Perimeter Is Dead —  Let’s Make It More Complex."  I knew that I wouldn’t get the example I wanted, but I did get
what I expected.  I started to write a very detailed response but stopped when I realized a couple of important things in reading his post as well as many of the comments:

• It’s clear that many folks simply don’t understand the underlying internal operating principles and architectures of security products on the market, and frankly for the most part they really shouldn’t have to.  However, if you’re going to start debating security architecture and engineering implementation of security software and hardware, it’s somewhat unreasonable to start generalizing and creating bad analogs about things you clearly don’t have experience with. 
   
• Believe it or not, most security companies that create bespoke security solutions do actually hire competent product management and engineering staff with the discipline, processes and practices that result in just a *little* bit more than copy/paste integration of software.  There are always exceptions, but if this were SOP, how many of them would still be in business?
   
• The FUD that vendors are accused of spreading to supposedly motivate consumers to purchase their products is sometimes outdone by the sheer lack of knowledge illustrated by the regurgitated drivel that is offered by people suggesting why these same products are not worthy of purchase. 

  In markets that have TAMs of $4+ Billion, either we’re all incompetent lemmings (to be argued elsewhere) or there are some compelling reasons for these products.  Sometimes it’s not solely security, for sure, but people don’t purchase security products with the expectations of being less secure with products that are more complex and put them more at risk.  Silliness.
   

• I find it odd that the people who maintain that they must have diversity in their security solution providers gag when I ask them for proof that they have invested in multiple switch and router vendors across their entire enterprise, that they deliberately deploy critical computing assets on disparate operating systems and that they have redundancy for all critical assets in their enterprise…including themselves. 
   
• It doesn’t make a lot of sense arguing about the utility, efficacy, usability and viability of a product with someone who has never actually implemented the solution they are arguing about and instead compares proprietary security products with a breadboard approach to creating a FrankenWall of non-integrated open source software on a common un-hardened Linux distro.
   
• Using words like complexity and risk within a theoretical context that has no empirical data offered to back it up short of a "gut reaction" and some vulnerability advisories in generally-available open source software lacks relevancy and is a waste of electrons.

I have proof points, ROI studies, security assessment results to the code level, and former customer case studies that demonstrate that some of the most paranoid companies on the planet see fit to purchase millions of dollars worth of supposedly "complex risk-increasing" solutions like these…I can tell you that they’re not all lemmings.

Again, not all of those bullets are directed at Don specifically, but I sense we’re
really just going to talk past one another on this point and the emails I’m getting trying to privately debate this point are agitating to say the least.

Your beer’s waiting, but expect an arm wrestle before you get to take the first sip.

/Hoff